By Kurosh Alyani

Manufacturing consent to bomb civilian infrastructure

November 17, 2026 - 17:54

TEHRAN - On November 16, 2026, in the middle of the U.S. and Israeli war on Iran, The New York Times published a report that used the locations of airstrikes to suggest why Iran had built dams. The headline began with “War” and presented a riddle about dams supposedly built for no clear reason. The accompanying photograph showed the wall of the Karun-4 Dam and openings in the rock on either side. Before reaching the first paragraph, the reader saw a real dam alongside a hypothesis about missile facilities. A correction at the end clarified that strikes had occurred nearby and that the dam itself had not been hit.


The correction fixed an error in the caption. A larger question remained. Why was Karun-4 pictured at all? The reporters never examine whether that dam serves a military facility. The photograph shows a dam. The corrected caption places it near an area that was struck. The headline invites the reader to connect the two. That gap between what the evidence establishes and what the presentation suggests runs through the article.

Sanam Mahoozi and Erika Solomon’s report runs to thirty paragraphs and fewer than 1,500 words. It opens with a question about dams, extends the inquiry to pipelines and water-transfer tunnels, and devotes a substantial part of the text to the detention of conservationists. It asks why water projects were built, whether military facilities use them and why conservationists were detained. It looks to the same set of airstrikes for answers to all three questions.

The material at the heart of the story is a researcher’s impression that two maps look alike. That observation could provide material for a few posts or give a reporter a lead to pursue. A newspaper report that asks why Iran built its dams has to show how the reporters tested that lead. The Times published the piece without showing the maps side by side, measuring the supposed overlap or documenting military use of a single dam. Publishing it in the form of a reported investigation was an unprofessional editorial decision. It gave an untested hypothesis the authority of completed reporting.

The article begins from the premise that some areas had no apparent need for these water projects. It provides no list of the projects in question, no estimates of their users’ needs and no account of the reasons given for approving them. The omission is especially consequential for water-transfer projects. A pipeline may cross an area with little demand on its way to a city with acute shortages. Before judging the rationale for building it, a reporter has to establish who was meant to receive the water, where, for what purpose and in what quantities.

The criteria for justifying dams have also changed substantially over the past few decades. A project once approved on the strength of how much water it could store, how much electricity it could generate and how much land it could irrigate might fail an assessment today that accounts for downstream water rights, displacement, environmental damage and changes in river flows. “Built under now-obsolete criteria” is a more precise description where the records support it. It identifies what needs investigating. Which criteria governed approval? Which costs were left out or given too little weight? How would the project fare under today’s standards?

Assessing a decision by present-day standards and explaining how it was made are separate tasks. A government may also continue to approve projects using old calculations after the basis for those calculations has changed. That raises questions about who kept the old criteria in place and who stood to benefit from proceeding. The Times treats the apparent inadequacy of the rationale as an opening for a theory about hidden military motives. It first needed to establish how the projects were justified and what those justifications actually left unexplained.
The main evidence comes from Nima Shokri, a water researcher at Hamburg University of Technology. He says he saw a map of strikes on suspected military sites whose overall pattern resembled his map of dams. His team had recorded at least 533 dams. Farzin Nadimi, a Washington-based military analyst, estimates that Iran has at least thirty missile sites. Those figures describe the size of two sets. The article never says how many dams were near a strike location, how far apart they were or what counted as near.

Even with a distance threshold and a count, the question of significance would remain. When two types of installation are concentrated in some of the same parts of a country, that concentration can explain a visual resemblance between the maps. To call the overlap striking, one would need some basis for judging how much proximity would ordinarily be expected in that geography. The article offers no such baseline, no side-by-side maps and no comparison with the distribution of other kinds of infrastructure.

There is a further problem with the strike map. By Shokri’s own account, it plots strikes on suspected military sites. The article does not identify the source of the map, explain which strikes it covers or say which targets were independently verified as military. Once the map stands in for an inventory of military facilities, the attacker’s targeting decisions become part of the evidence. The resulting pattern is then used to infer why the country under attack built its dams.

Seven experts told the reporters that it made sense for large military facilities to have reliable water and electricity. Hospitals, factories, universities and cities have the same needs. Reliable utilities can explain why a military facility would benefit from a particular location. To explain why a dam was built, one has to establish whether the facility actually drew water or power from that dam and whether its needs influenced the decision to build it. Even proof of military use today would leave that second question open. A facility could have connected to the network years after the project was approved.

Yazd gave the reporters an opportunity to test the idea in one specific case. Amir AghaKouchak, a professor at the University of California, Irvine, says he had long been puzzled by a major project to transfer water to Yazd. After the strikes and subsequent reporting on a missile facility in the region, he began to suspect that military considerations might have influenced the project. The Times cites the Financial Times on the existence of a missile facility. Its account of the water project ends with AghaKouchak’s suspicion. There is no record of the construction decision, no chronology linking the two projects, no allocation data and no evidence that the military facility received water from the project.

The identities and roles of the sources matter because the article asks readers to give their judgments weight. The Times does not identify all seven experts. It identifies Danny Citrinowicz, who argues that access to water and power helps military facilities keep operating, as a former Israeli military intelligence analyst. In a separate interview, he said he favored overthrowing Iran’s government in principle and doubted the war could achieve it. AghaKouchak publicly expressed hope that Iran’s rulers would be removed from power and brought to trial. He was also identified as an environmental adviser to a project planning for the period after the fall of the Islamic Republic. The Times article does not disclose that role.

Nadimi has written that Washington should be prepared to support a change of government if Iranians choose it. His estimate of the number of missile sites still has to be assessed on its own merits. There is also a relationship closer to the reporting itself. Mahoozi and Shokri had previously co-written an article about Tehran’s water shortage. Both were among the authors of a paper on Iranian water policy that also included Kaveh Madani, another source in the Times article.
Readers assessing how independently the sources arrived at their views were given no account of those collaborations.

Both reporters had experience that made the omissions consequential. Mahoozi studied journalism and wrote her doctoral thesis on how the media framed Iran’s water protests. Solomon covered the wars in Syria and Iraq before becoming the Times bureau chief for Iran and Iraq. During the current war, she had already reported on what U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iranian infrastructure did to the people who depended on it. In the dams story, the focus shifts. The strikes become a way to interpret the infrastructure itself. The reporting needed to show what warranted that inference.

The reporters say they sought comment from Iran’s Foreign Ministry, Energy Ministry and Revolutionary Guards and received no response. The article quotes no project designer, operator or specialist based in Iran who could speak to how the projects were approved or how their water was actually used. Public planning records, allocation data or an assessment of demand at the destination could also have helped test the claim. The unanswered requests for official comment leave those reporting questions open.

A substantial part of the article concerns the detention of conservationists in 2018. Morad Tahbaz, who was convicted of cooperating with the United States as a hostile state and sentenced to ten years in prison, gives his own account of his interrogators’ interest in the group’s work in Hormozgan. The Times offers no independent corroboration of his account. It places a later strike alongside his recollection to suggest that the group may have been working near a sensitive site. That possibility leaves several questions unanswered. What, if anything, did the group find? Did any information reach a foreign government? And what does the episode establish about the decision to build any water project? The article raises a second mystery and uses the war to suggest an answer to it, too.

There is a precedent for this way of presenting a suspected military use. Before Israeli forces entered Gaza’s Al-Shifa Hospital in November 2023, the Israeli military released a three-dimensional model of what it portrayed as an extensive Hamas command center beneath the hospital. A tunnel was found after the troops entered, and U.S. intelligence agencies said the complex had been used for military purposes. The Washington Post’s review of the public evidence did not substantiate the original depiction of an extensive command center or establish that the tunnel could be accessed from hospital wards. By then, the public had already seen a detailed picture of what the Israeli military said was there.

That picture acquired another kind of authority on social media. The Israeli journalist Edy Cohen posted a video of a woman posing as an Al-Shifa nurse who claimed Hamas had taken the hospital’s medicine and fuel. France 24 found that the video was staged. The military model gave audiences a picture of what was supposedly happening underground. The staged video gave them what looked like testimony from inside the hospital. To understand how the allegation spread, one has to follow what accounts passed to one another as well as what the military said.

The strike on the Shajareh Tayyebeh school in Minab shows how far such claims can travel before officials repeat them. Within hours, accounts sympathetic to or associated with Israel were circulating images as proof that an Iranian missile had struck the school. Al Jazeera traced one widely shared image to the outskirts of Zanjan. Accounts on X and Facebook republished footage with identical captions. Two posts falsely claiming that Iran had admitted responsibility drew nearly eight million views between them by March 2. Other accounts disputed that the building was a school or that children had been killed. By the time Trump blamed Iran, the claim had already reached millions.
No credible evidence has surfaced for the specific claim that there was a missile launcher beneath the school. Reporting on the preliminary U.S. investigation pointed to outdated data that may have left the school building classified as a military target. The United States was responsible for verifying the military status of the building it struck. Whatever stood nearby, the burden of verification belonged to the attacker. It is precisely this burden that disappears when an unsupported claim about hidden military use takes over the story of a strike.

The dams article was also repackaged as it circulated. In Persian, Mahoozi called the overlap substantial. In English, she called it striking. Iran International put the possibility that the dams had been built to support missile bases in its English headline. A reader who saw only the headline and photograph encountered a concrete suggestion of military use. The missing measurements, the absence of an identified military user and the uncertainty about why the projects were built were much harder to see.

Shokri subsequently wrote on X that proximity to military targets neither explains why dams were built nor justifies attacking them. Madani publicly challenged the proposed connection between dams and missiles. Shokri’s clarification is especially telling because his observation is the starting point of the Times article. A researcher described a resemblance. A reporter promoted it as striking. A follow-up headline foregrounded a possible military reason for building the dams. The public record shows that progression. It leaves open whether anyone coordinated the distribution.

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf answered by applying the same reasoning to dams, ports and power plants near U.S. or Israeli bases. His response puts the evidentiary rule to a simple test. If mere proximity can make an Iranian dam suspect, the same reasoning can cast suspicion on civilian installations almost anywhere. The fact that the inference can be reproduced so easily is precisely what makes it useless for determining the actual function of a particular facility.

The Times had two ways to take the story beyond a hypothesis. It could document a specific project, establish who used its water and trace any military requirement back to the decision to build it. It could also publish a geographic analysis that measured the overlap and tested it against what the distribution of infrastructure would ordinarily produce. It did neither. In Minab, investigating the strike exposed a possible error in the attacker’s classification of a building. In the dams story, the fact that an area had been struck was itself used to lend weight to a military interpretation of the infrastructure around it.

The New York Times did all this while its own country was at war with Iran. It supplied a military rationale for treating Iranian civilian water infrastructure as a potential target without establishing the alleged military use of a single dam. That rationale is already in circulation, ready to be cited if another strike needs defending. By publishing it in that form, the Times took part in laying the groundwork for a potential war crime. It took the locations of earlier attacks and used them to make the next attack easier to justify.

Leave a Comment